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CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED AND THE GAPS 
REMAINING 
Roda Mushkat† 
Abstract: Chinese willingness and ability to play by the rules in the global arena 
is a critical issue that has long loomed large on the academic and policy agendas.  A 
substantial body of knowledge has been built in the past two decades, shedding 
considerable light on key dimensions of the question.  However, there is an apparent need 
to fine-tune the approach pursued thus far by seeking greater methodological robustness 
and better theoretical elucidation.  Data collection procedures must be anchored more 
firmly in principles of scientific inquiry, providing a solid empirical foundation for 
reliable and valid generalizations, and single-cause explanations need to be jettisoned in 
favor of multi-pronged approaches. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s historical journey in the contemporary era has been 
remarkably tumultuous.  In the political domain, the embryonic republican 
institutions, which had displaced crumbling imperial structures, had been 
violently supplanted by an authoritarian order of the hard variety, which in 
turn has been deliberately transformed into a soft one.  In the economic 
realm, a highly decentralized and largely agrarian system, based on small-
scale farming and commerce organized along essentially feudal lines, had 
been forcefully cast off in favor of a rigid top-down communist edifice 
designed to bring about rapid industrialization, which later has been mostly 
dismantled following an ideological shift toward gradual liberalization.  In 
the international sphere, selective engagement, albeit colored by nationalist 
sentiment, had given way to withdrawal, which subsequently has 
metamorphosed into renewed engagement, even though restrained at times.1 
This is a generalization and, consequently, an oversimplification.  In 
fact, the historical phases have not been as uniform as implied above.  Each 
has been characterized by zigzag, rather than linear, movement.  The 
superficial impression may be that the Maoist period had featured a 
relentless pursuit of power by a single-minded revolutionary elite, 
unwavering collectivization, and ardent isolationism.  However, this is not 
                                                      
†
 Professor and Director of the Center for International and Public Law, Brunel Law School, Brunel 
University; Honorary Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong; and Visiting Professor, 
Kadoorie Institute, University of Hong Kong.  I wish to thank Miron Mushkat for helping me navigate 
through social science territory and the Kadoorie Institute for its research support, but the author is solely 
responsible for the views expressed herein. 
1
 See generally KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH 
REFORM (2d ed., W.W. Norton 2004); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND 
GROWTH (The MIT Press 2007).  
42 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 1 
an accurate portrayal of the strategic thrust at the time.  Both policy direction 
and pace had varied considerably during that stage of the post-1949 regime 
adaptation.  This complicates the picture and exacerbates, rather than 
diminishes, the sense of perpetual and unpredictable motion.2 
Students of international relations have naturally focused on the 
descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive facets of external cooperation and 
estrangement.   They have been driven by a mixture of intellectual curiosity 
and practical considerations.  The former has been inspired by growing 
interdependence, as distinct from mere interconnectedness, among States, 
and its increasing complexity,3 coupled with the traditional Chinese 
propensity to resist the pull of the center and chart an autonomous course.4  
These two contradictory trends have been perceived as a source of actual 
and potential friction, and their problematic coexistence has stimulated 
academic interest and inquiry.5 
China is thought to have been generally uncomfortable with the 
concept of interdependence because it has been at variance with the core 
values of independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance.  The first (duli, or 
more fully, duli zizhu) is equated with preserving autonomy and maintaining 
initiative.  The second (zhuquan) is associated with the exercise of exclusive 
power.  The third (zili gengsheng) places strong emphasis on regeneration 
through one’s own efforts, and possesses deep historical roots, as well as 
Buddhist underpinnings, which may extend as far as the Tang Dynasty.6 
The practical concerns have stemmed from the resources—notably, 
economic base, military arsenal, and population—at the disposal of the 
country and the competence it has displayed in recent years in converting 
them into capabilities.7  Since it has not consistently adopted a cooperative 
posture, and has at times acted in a defiant fashion, considerable research 
has been channeled into determining how to prevent the Chinese threat from 
materializing, with some analysts advocating positive inducements 
(engagement) and others favoring negative therapy (containment).8 
These concerns have abated, but have not vanished altogether, as 
pragmatism has intensified and ideological fervor has receded in China.  The 
evolution of its foreign policy behavior during the contemporary era has 
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come over time to be more confidently seen as featuring gradual, albeit 
uneven, progression from autarky, self-reliance, and dependence (an 
asymmetrical configuration, such as that prevailing in 1949-1958, the lean-
to-one-side period characterized by a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union) 
toward a recognition, although not unambiguous, of the necessity and merits 
of (symmetrical) interdependence.9  As this pattern has crystallized, the 
sense of unease has subsided and the attractions of engagement have begun 
to outweigh those of containment.10 
Nothing symbolizes more poignantly the transition from a profoundly 
inward-looking orientation to an essentially outward-looking one than the 
commitment, even if mostly rhetorical at this juncture, to build a 
“harmonious world with an open mind.”11  It was enunciated by Chinese 
President Hu Jintao at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) 
CEO Summit on November 17, 2005, and signaled, at the highest strategic 
level, a willingness to embrace multilateralism, practice it in a mutually-
beneficial manner, accept cultural diversity openly and without prejudice, 
and make a tangible contribution to the process of enhancing the 
effectiveness of global governance mechanisms.12 
However, this is not a clear-cut picture.  Attention is thus commonly 
drawn to the word, or deed disjuncture, or the gap “between the ideals, 
principles, and orientations expressed in policy pronouncements and the 
actual conduct of foreign policy.”13  The implication is that China should be 
judged by the strategies that it pursues rather than those that it espouses.14  
The motives for the newfound enthusiasm for multilateralism have also been 
subject to critical scrutiny.  It has been argued that it may reflect utilitarian 
considerations rather than a fundamental cognitive adjustment culminating 
in the formation of benign worldview, or that both influences may be at 
work.15 
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Similar themes pervade the literature on Chinese attitudes toward 
international law.16  The focus there is primarily, but not exclusively, on 
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compliance.  A trend featuring greater adherence to international rules is 
discerned.17  This is an inevitable product of liberalization at home and 
integration into the global community.  Yet, again, the pattern that emerges 
is not indicative of linear movement from autarky to interdependence.18  The 
word versus deed dichotomy frequently surfaces and the issue of motives 
continues to loom large on the unfolding research agenda.19 
The writings on China’s international legal compliance are less 
voluminous than those on its international relations.  They are also not as 
interconnected and systematic.  There is no strong sense of collective 
endeavor leading to the gradual accumulation of knowledge.  The theoretical 
and methodological underpinnings cannot be portrayed as robust.  The 
corollary is that it may be desirable to pause and assess what has been 
achieved to date, particularly in descriptive and explanatory terms (policy 
prescription may be regarded as a separate issue), and where analytical 
resources should be directed for further progress to be realized.   This is the 
purpose of the present paper. 
II. TAKING STOCK OF SCHOLARLY DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Conceptual Architecture 
Researchers in the field of international law commonly proceed to 
examine State behavior in a normative context without addressing 
preliminary analytical issues routinely attended to by students of other social 
phenomena.  This may reflect the fact that the predominantly inductive 
nature of legal inquiry fosters a shared understanding of the ideas explored 
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The Domestic-International Nexus, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 291 (2008) [hereinafter Chan, Lee & Chan, 
China’s Environmental Governance]; Roda Mushkat, Dissecting International Compliance: An Unfinished 
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and patterns observed.  Certain established formalities strictly adhered to by 
practitioners of deductive logic may thus be dispensed with and the problem 
at hand may be investigated in an unencumbered fashion.  However, in an 
intellectually fluid domain such as the study of international legal 
compliance,20 it may be desirable to place a broad evaluation, such as 
undertaken here, within a systematic framework. 
Rule conformity in the international arena, or lack thereof, is a 
variable—whether binary (yes versus no), ordered categorical (more or less, 
without specifying the degree), or continuous.  Variables, in turn, are 
embedded in concepts.  A careful dissection of the former must generally be 
preceded by a methodical scrutiny of the latter.  This is a time-honored 
proposition reaffirmed decades ago by two social scientists who have 
stipulated that, prior to seeking to determine the presence or absence of some 
attribute (e.g., compliance), “or before we can rank objects or measure them 
in terms of some variable, we must form the concept of that variable.”21  The 
implication is that a systematic framework for grappling with adherence to 
international law needs to rest on a solid conceptual foundation. 
The linkage with variables may generate overly narrow connotations.   
In fact, concepts stretch far afield analytically in that they may be viewed as 
theories about ontology, or to state it more explicitly, as “theories about the 
fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon.”22  By extension, they 
focus on “the core characteristics of a phenomenon and their 
interrelationships.”23  Moreover, they possess explanatory power by virtue of 
identifying ontological features that “play a key role in 
casual . . . mechanisms.”24 Finally, they have a realist dimension because 
their use “involves an empirical analysis of the phenomenon.”25  It follows 
that concept is a “somewhat more abstract term than . . . variable, and it 
implies a richness, depth, and complexity that undermines any sense of 
oversimplification.”26 
Concept formation is a multilevel and multidimensional process.  The 
first, and analytically most basic, level entails broad yet compact 
specification of the concept (e.g., parliamentary democracy), as typically 
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 See generally Mushkat, Dissecting International Compliance, supra note 16. 
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 Paul F. Lazarsfeld & Allen H. Barton, Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: 
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25
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 DAVID W. BRITT, A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION TO MODELING: QUALITATIVE AND 
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seen in theoretical propositions.27  At the secondary level, the constitutive 
dimensions of the concept are identified (e.g., for democracy, these may be 
universal franchise, competitive elections, civil rights, and so forth).28  The 
third level consists of conversion into empirical indicators, or data-centered 
operationalization of the concept.29 
The progression from one level to another is an open-ended and 
iterative, rather than top-down and linear, undertaking.  Notably, the 
secondary-level constitutive dimensions are often combined, via addition or 
multiplication, to arrive at the basic- or first-level concept, although 
disaggregation involving movement in the opposite direction is not 
uncommon.30  By the same token, the quest for empirical indicators is 
seldom implemented in one step but generally entails several rounds of 
meaningful adjustment characterized by intensive circular cross-level 
movement.31 
Traditionally, the aggregation of secondary-level constitutive 
dimensions into a coherent basic- or first-level concept has been 
underpinned by the Aristotelian notion of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  In classical philosophical thought, concept definition requires 
the specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
phenomenon to fit into a designated category.32  Each of these standards is a 
secondary dimension:  “the structural glue that binds the secondary-level 
dimensions together to form the basic level is the mathematics of necessary 
and sufficient conditions.”33 
Developments in cognitive psychology, logic, and philosophy have 
paved the way for another approach to concept construction, one focused on 
family resemblance, dispensing altogether with the necessary and sufficient 
conditions requirement.34  According to this criterion, “[a]ll one needs is 
enough resemblance on secondary-level dimensions to be part of the 
family.”35  The proposition reflects the realization that concepts may have no 
essential attributes but nevertheless exhibit likeness that justifies grouping 
under one rubric.36  Thus, “[w]hether a certain animal is considered a ‘bird’ 
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depends on how similar it is to prototypical birds like robins, sparrows, 
etc.”37 
The difference between the two yardsticks may be highlighted by 
juxtaposing a definition of a militarized interstate dispute with that of an 
international crisis.  The latter has been portrayed as a situation with three 
necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a State’s 
external or internal environment.  All three are perceptions held by the 
highest level decision-makers of the actors concerned:  1) a threat to basic 
values, along with 2) the awareness of finite time for response to the external 
value threat, and 3) a high probability of involvement in military hostilities.38 
By contrast, the term militarized interstate dispute refers to “united 
historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display, or use of military 
force short of war by one member State is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of 
another State.” 39  The principal dimension of this concept is the presence of 
a threat or resort to force short of war.  Any potential militarized dispute is 
explored by assessing all participants.  If any exhibits a level of hostility 
exceeding the threshold of a “serious threat to use military force,”40 then that 
State and its target join the population of dispute actors. 
The threat or recourse to force is not a necessary condition for 
qualifying as such.  A target in a dispute may be classified as a party to the 
conflict even if it refrains from reciprocating threats or forcefully retaliating.   
The structural principle employed here is the maximum level of hostility 
displayed by any of the participants.  Once any participant crosses the threat 
threshold, all targets of such action are included as dispute actors even if 
they do not surpass the threshold themselves.  The concept of a militarized 
interstate dispute is thus an effective example of the family resemblance 
invocation of the maximum criterion for dyadic and multilateral 
relationships. 
This illustrates that concepts are not carved in stone, or that they may 
be loosened up and tightened up, as circumstances warrant.  In technical 
parlance, this is known as concept extension and intension.41  Loosening up 
is accompanied by a decrease in intension and an increase in extension (i.e., 
the scope of the concept widens and it becomes more elastic).  Tightening up 
                                                      
37
 Id.  
38
 See MICHAEL BRECHER, JONATHAN WILKENFELD & SHEILA MOSER, CRISES IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: VOLUME I HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES 3 (Pergamon Press 1988).     
39
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has the opposite impact.42  In the example above, the concept of militarized 
interstate dispute has greater extension, or lesser intension, than that of a 
crisis for two reasons that may be readily discerned. 
First, to be categorized as a militarized dispute actor, a participant 
does not have to embark on any military initiative at all, whereas to qualify 
as a crisis actor three necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient need to 
be met.  Second, the militarized dispute procedure takes into account merely 
the one dimension of level of hostility in establishing whether a crucial event 
(a militarized interstate dispute) has occurred, while the screening device 
relied upon in drawing a similar conclusion regarding another crucial event 
(a crisis) again stringently requires the satisfaction of three necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions.  This, in turn, raises the issue of where to draw 
the line between positive and negative cases (e.g., compliance versus non-
compliance).  On the one hand, if a concept is loosened up excessively, 
virtually any kind of behavior may be seen as consistent with rule 
conformity.  On the other hand, if it is tightened up markedly, scarcely any 
type of conduct may be regarded as fulfilling the lofty standards of strict 
adherence to the law.43  There is no magic formula for striking a balance 
between the two objectives, but a disciplined approach, coupled with a high 
degree of transparency, is called for.44 
The notion of family resemblance suggests that concept formation 
involves grouping together phenomena that have properties in common 
(convergence) and separating ones that have different properties in common 
(divergence or differentiation).45  A parallel process entails mapping 
phenomena with common properties onto dimensions ranging from low to 
high, in order to facilitate discriminations based on intensity, maturity, 
potency, and so forth.46  Convergent or divergent and discriminant strategies 
feature in qualitative (i.e., with similar characteristics to those pursued in the 
legal field) as well as quantitative research.47 
As pointed out earlier, concepts need to be matched with empirical 
indicators, necessitating the construction of concept-indicator models.48  As 
they do not dwell in a theoretical vacuum, the relationships between 
concepts must also be specified.49  The relevant dimensions in this respect 
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43
 See id. at 19-22. 
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may include direction (one or both ways), linearity (or lack thereof), polarity 
(whether the connected concepts change in the same or opposite direction), 
strength (intensity of the linkage), symmetry (whether the polarities 
observed are contingent on the direction of the driving concept), and 
temporality (i.e., the relative time order of related concepts).50  Connecting 
concepts is at the heart of the theory-building or model-construction 
process.51 
B. Reviewing Insights Generated To Date 
Chinese compliance with international law has primarily been 
explored at the basic or first level, but without overlooking essential 
methodological issues.  The term at which the scholarly effort has been 
directed—typically left unexplained in the emerging literature on the 
subject, presumably because its meaning was implicitly assumed to be 
widely shared—is formally defined in recent writings, albeit not necessarily 
in a uniform fashion.  For example, in a paper selectively examining China’s 
adherence to the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the 
Question of Hong Kong, compliance is broadly equated with “a state of 
conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule.”52 
It is also noted that some authors incorporate motives into their 
extended definitions by highlighting a distinction between compliance 
secured by negative-style tactics (e.g., fear of punishment) and more positive 
or softer attitudinal methods (e.g., inculcation of norms via explicit or tacit 
educational socialization).53  This observation is qualified by remarking that 
the practice is not common and that the issue of causality is generally dealt 
with separately.54  Another distinction underscored in the same paper is that 
between compliance and implementation, which is viewed as “the process of 
converting commitments into action and legal system effectiveness.”55  The 
reason lies in the fact that “rule effectiveness may persist in the face of low 
compliance and high compliance may coincide with ineffective standards.”56 
The differentiation between negative and positive tactics, and the act 
of conformity and implementation, constitutes a simple form of a divergent 
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research strategy.  Other useful distinctions have been put forth by students 
of Chinese international legal compliance.  One is that between a State’s 
globally responsible conduct and its adherence to international rules.57   
There is a clear linkage between the two notions which needs to be brought 
into focus through appropriate conceptual mapping.  Nevertheless, each term 
possesses different connotations and centers on a distinct phenomenon. 
An additional difference illuminatingly expounded in the current 
literature is that between compliance and cooperation.  The former merits 
close attention, but it “is not the whole story.  To gain a complete 
understanding of the dynamics of [S]tate integration into the international 
system, we must go [further].”58   “Consequently, [i]n this book, . . . ‘beyond 
compliance’ is used as an analytical concept, designating the need to move 
beyond sole consideration of formal compliance (and non-compliance) in 
evaluating the integration of a [S]tate into the international system, to the 
broader political questions of cooperation (and non-cooperation).”59 
Globally responsible States do not invariably respect international law 
and, if States do, this is not necessarily an affirmation of their propensity to 
consistently act in a manner conducive to global well-being.60  By the same 
token, “cooperation may not always lead to compliance with rules, and 
compliance can occur without cooperation, for instance, as a consequence of 
the imposition of coercive sanctions.”61  However, such divergences should 
not be overstated.  Thus, “if a [S]tate’s compliance with an international 
norm or rule is associated with long-term cooperation, it is more likely to be 
a function of ‘deep’ compliance whereas, without cooperation, compliance 
may be merely instrumental.”62 
The attempts to place Chinese adherence to international law in a 
wider context apparently reflect residual concerns about the motives and 
quality of commitments of a former “rogue” State which is rapidly evolving 
into a global power, having already achieved a prominent regional status.   
The trend is also indicative of the growing maturity of scholarship in this 
field.  Without loosening up the notion of compliance, researchers engage in 
de facto conceptual mapping, highlighting fundamental disjunctions and 
connections, and generating theoretical enlightenment in the process. 
                                                      
57
 See generally CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, supra note 16, at 11-76. 
58
 KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 16, at 16. 
59
 Id. 
60
 See generally CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, supra note 16, at 11-76. 
61
 KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 16, at 18. 
62
 Id. 
 
52 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 1 
As suggested earlier, these attempts are largely confined to the basic 
or first level of the analytical structure outlined in the present paper.  Yet, 
there are exceptions to the norm.  A notable example is the work of a group 
of researchers who boldly endeavored to predict, before the resumption of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong by China in 1997, the country’s likely 
compliance with the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.  They 
concluded erroneously that this international legal instrument would be 
blatantly disregarded by Chinese policy makers, but a salient feature of their 
survey was a detailed specification of how exactly the flaunting of the rules 
might possibly manifest itself at the secondary level.63 
This particular illustration may also serve the purpose of underscoring 
the increasing diversity of the writings on China’s international legal 
compliance.  Initially, for obvious reasons, there was a predominance of 
negative cases, in which non-observance of the law was given prominence.64   
Later, the focus has shifted to positive cases.65  Interestingly, however, the 
grey zone lying between the two ends of the continuum has remained in the 
theoretical spotlight.  For instance, the ambiguities characterizing Chinese 
attitudes toward the World Trade Organization have recently been 
dissected.66 
Determining conceptual linkages, within an explanatory framework, 
has been the ultimate aim of case analysis—whether negative, positive, or 
neutral in its orientation.  Various theoretical propositions have been 
formulated regarding the drivers (causes) of China’s posture vis-à-vis 
international law (effect).  At the risk of some oversimplification, it can be 
said that scholars drawn to the negative cases have been inclined to embrace 
Austinian-realist and Hobbesian-utilitarian perspectives, and that those 
gravitating toward the positive cases have tended to opt for Kantian-liberal 
and Benthamian-constructivist or cognitivist interpretative schemes.67 
The weight of negative cases has been so substantial and the 
intellectual pull of the realist and (neoclassical) utilitarian traditions so 
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strong that these approaches have inevitably had a far more pronounced 
impact on model-building or theory-development geared toward 
methodically illuminating Chinese international legal compliance than any 
other analytical paradigms.  Researchers who subscribe to such views 
portray China as a unitary actor bent on enhancing its national interest, 
mostly expressed in material (economic and military) terms, and 
maneuvering accordingly in all circumstances and on all fronts, including 
with respect to international law. 
The assertion that, everywhere and at any juncture, Chinese external 
strategies are underpinned by the maxi or mini principle resonates with 
scholars who belong to this school of thought.  That crisply-enunciated 
principle states that China’s conduct of foreign affairs is inspired by a desire 
to maximize its rights and interests and to minimize its responsibilities and 
normative costs.  The pursuit of this compact formula triggers an 
unscrupulous “quest to make the best of all possible worlds.”68  Symptoms 
of such a stance may be seen in neo-mercantilist international economic 
practices69 and a tendency to free ride on the back of obligations assumed by 
others to constrain the production and/or deployment of particular arms 
while avoiding as much as possible similar undertakings.70  In the military 
domain, the following strategic tenets are apparently adhered to: 
 
1) Maximize material capabilities above all.  State security rests 
in large measure on possessing the unilateral ability to use 
military force against any potential adversary.  The constraints 
on this ability should therefore be as low as technologically and 
economically feasible. 
2) Avoid high cost commitments.  This follows from the first 
decision rule.  High costs are defined as any commitment which 
prevents or closes off future options to improve relative military 
capabilities. 
3) If avoidance incurs image costs, then try to avoid high cost 
commitments but join low cost, high profile activities.  More 
specifically, pursue high profile unilateral commitments and 
pledges, and eschew high cost multilateral commitments.  This 
decision rule maximizes image payoffs, and minimizes the 
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chance of getting entrapped in a process over which China has 
less control or in which its bargaining power is diluted by an 
increased number of players.  
4) If the opportunities to pursue material gains unilaterally are 
closed off, and China has little choice but to join multilateral 
negotiations, then it should try to build coalitions to weaken 
commitments.  The reason is that although fear of opprobrium 
may make it pay to cooperate, the total payoff may still be 
higher if China does not have to make any costly multilateral 
commitments at all.  Thus China should try to create an 
alternative coalition of [S]tates which provides it with sufficient 
back[-]patting benefits to counteract the opprobrium from the 
avoidance of substantive commitments. 
5) If unilateral opportunities to maximize relative capabilities 
are closed off, and coalition building unsuccessful, then China 
should choose the least constraining options; try to prevent the 
toughening of any commitments that cannot be avoided (e.g., 
try to dilute compliance requirements).71 
 
Determined asset accumulation is believed to extend beyond the 
material (i.e., economic and military) realm.  Reputation, both abroad and at 
home, an intangible resource but a highly valuable one, is also thought to be 
a factor in the strategic decision calculus.  International rules may thus be 
respected because Chinese policy makers may be eager to bolster the 
country’s image, and astutely leverage it in a subsequent search for further 
tangible assets, or shore up their own domestic position by expediently 
conforming to external standards and engaging in visible forms of 
international cooperation.72 
Such ruthless amassing of resources, both tangible and intangible, for 
State or individual benefit features prominently in realist and (neoclassical) 
utilitarian accounts of actor behavior in the global arena.  Game theorists 
complicate this elegant analytical picture by introducing a distinction 
between collaboration and coordination games.  The former has mixed 
implications for compliance with international law:  while all participants 
are better off if they all conform, shirking may serve the interests of 
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individual players.73  It is posited that China is a consummate practitioner of 
collaboration strategies. 
By contrast, coordination games reflect situations in which actors 
benefit from the existence of a collective rule.  The classic example is the 
requirement to drive on the right (or left) side of the road, but not both.   
Once such a rule is established, the incentive to shirk markedly diminishes, 
or even vanishes altogether.  In such circumstances, compliance may be 
regarded as an equilibrium outcome.74  Recent academic work suggests that 
the Chinese foreign policy apparatus is not oblivious to the logic of this 
argument and may have internalized it, at least selectively.75 
Unlike in some mathematical formulations and contrived laboratory 
settings, real-life games are typically, albeit not invariably, ongoing.   
Wherever this is the case, participants are likely to develop a heightened 
awareness of their interdependence and enter into collaborative 
arrangements.76  This is the theme pervading the institutionalist literature on 
international legal compliance.  The State continues to be perceived as a 
self-centered unitary player.  Nevertheless, members of the global 
community cooperate, forge agreements, and often even construct or 
maintain elaborate regimes, both formal and informal.  For them, case-
specific rule conformity may be a rewarding long-term strategy consistent 
with the national (as well as individual ruler) interest.77 
Researchers exploring China’s compliance with international law 
seldom explicitly identify themselves with institutionalism or the new 
institutionalism.  Yet, it would not be inappropriate to place a sizeable group 
in this category.  The assumptions they embrace and the conclusions they 
reach are not dissimilar to those seen in institutionalist writings.78  The 
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notion of a regime, participation in such structures, and adherence to their 
rules is also beginning to be earnestly examined.79  It would be premature to 
suggest that this loosely-defined position is replacing realism and 
(neoclassical) utilitarianism as the dominant paradigm in the systematic 
study of Chinese rule conformity in the global arena, but there can be little 
doubt that it is an influential perspective, whatever its precise impact. 
Constructivism or cognitivism is another approach, with deep roots in 
this particular context, which has been recycled in a specific fashion by 
scholars dissecting China’s international legal compliance and is displaying 
considerable staying power.  It has anthropological underpinnings because 
of the emphasis accorded to cultural mechanisms as drivers (causes) of State 
actions (effects).  Analysts who employ this conceptual vehicle contend that, 
in addressing macro-level phenomena, researchers should “start with the 
recognition that nations like individuals . . . develop visions, dreams and 
prejudices about themselves and the world that shape their 
intentions . . . [,which makes it necessary] to consider the mind-sets of 
leaders and people.”80 
A book, which has attracted much academic attention, aptly titled 
Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics,81 has provided an 
impetus to the application of this framework to a number of pivotal Chinese 
foreign policy issues.  A leading sinologist has thus invoked image 
structures and perception gaps to shed light on the posture vis-à-vis the 
United States.82  Others have resorted to such concepts to explain attitudes 
toward and relations with Japan83 and the Soviet Union.84  These theoretical 
efforts have complemented the strand of academic literature based on realist 
and (neoclassical) utilitarian postulates.   
Indeed, sinologists practiced constructivism or cognitivism long 
before the term was formally incorporated into the international politics 
lexicon.  The psychological significance of perceived Chinese ascendancy as 
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a Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo) was consistently emphasized and it was 
noted that, symbolically, “it is a measure of a world in disequilibrium if 
China does not have a place of respect commensurate with its size and 
history.”85  The impact of this strategic configuration came sharply to the 
surface when an empirically-oriented social scientist observed “the almost 
universally expressed desire of Chinese to economically, culturally and 
politically resume their ‘rightful place’ . . . in the region, and ultimately in 
the world . . . a vision shared across generations, walks of life, and system 
levels.”86 
Despite its perceived pre-eminence as a Middle Kingdom, China had 
also been subject to adverse cyclical patterns, characterized by dynastic falls 
during which the Mandate of Heaven was periodically withdrawn, but 
eventually followed by another reacceleration in momentum.  The Century 
of Humiliation (bainain guochi), in the aftermath of the defeat in the First 
Opium War (1839-1842), which lasted until the end of the Second World 
War, was the most painful such episode, arousing a sense of “humiliation, 
impotence, and rage felt by China’s elites in the face of colonial 
representation of their country and their people.  This humiliation knew no 
political boundaries,”87 deeply affecting the stance toward the outside world 
and the conduct of foreign policy.88 
The vulnerabilities that came to the fore during the Century of 
Humiliation notwithstanding, China continued to be perceived as potentially 
powerful, and hence threatening, by virtue of its large population, physical 
size, and vast resources.  Even as the country was laid prostrate and suffered 
foreign subjugation in the wake of the Boxer Uprising (1898-1901), 
“Westerners like Robert Hart were nevertheless warning from Beijing in 
1900 that the future will have a ‘Yellow’ question—perhaps a ‘yellow 
peril’—to deal with, [and that this prognosis] is as certain as the [assertion 
that the] sun will shine tomorrow.”89  Again, that sentiment had profoundly 
influenced cognitions on both sides, turning into the behavioral equivalent of 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.90 
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Realists and (neoclassical) utilitarians do not dismiss the significance 
of cultural constructs.  However, they grapple with the notion on their own 
terms.  The picture painted in their work is one of a strategic tradition 
entirely consistent with the premises underlying the realpolitik paradigm.91  
It is even argued that the psychological burden wrought by the Century of 
Humiliation has opportunistically been exploited as a strategic weapon in a 
quest for national advantage.92  For instance:  “because of their perception of 
the country as a victim of historical wrongs, China’s leaders have developed 
what might be called a diplomatic culture of entitlement, as may be seen 
from their expectation of favorable treatment from Japan by invoking war-
time guilt or from the United States by demanding generosity as of right.”93 
Such revisionist assessments have not prevented implicit, and at times 
explicit, constructivism or cognitivism from remaining an integral part of the 
repertoire of students of Chinese foreign policy.  Indeed, in the field of 
compliance with international law, some of the most detailed and 
theoretically coherent exploration has been undertaken in a manner 
sympathetic to this analytical perspective.94  That scholarly endeavor has 
yielded conceptual insights dovetailing with transnational legal theory, a 
school of thought that highlights the impact of State participation in global 
processes (with special reference to those embedded in international law), 
which may be viewed as forms of direct and indirect socialization (causes), 
on attitudes (or images) that shape strategic responses (effects).95 
The propagation of international norms is believed to materialize 
through a number of channels and involve several socialization agents 
emitting mutually-reinforcing impulses such as bureaucratic compliance 
procedures, governmental norm sponsors, interpretive communities and law-
declaring forums, issue linkages, transnational issue networks, and 
transnational entrepreneurs.96  Of these, the first and the second are thought 
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to already exert influence in China,97 an evaluation that perhaps understates 
the importance of the role played by agents not formally associated with the 
State (e.g., non-governmental organizations in the environmental domain).98 
Persuasion theory, borrowed from social psychology, is invoked to 
suggest that previously peripheral (or not closely integrated) actors like the 
Chinese may be particularly amenable to international socialization because 
of their entry into relatively unfamiliar segments of the global arena and 
generally fresh mind (i.e., the presence of few cognitive priors or prior 
beliefs).99  That said, it does not necessarily follow that the learning process 
invariably culminates in the full and unqualified internalization of 
international norms.100  In fact, instrumental adoption, motivated by tactical 
considerations, may take place.101 
This approach is viewed by its proponents not just as another 
component of a multi-pronged strategy to gain better understanding of 
China’s international legal behavior but as the most appropriate analytical 
tool for addressing the task.  It is said to be conceptually superior to the 
perspectives examined earlier (realism, utilitarianism, and new 
institutionalism) and others that have been accorded less attention by 
researchers in this domain (e.g., rule-legitimacy theory, internationalism, or 
rule-identity theory and managerialism).102  Whether or not the claim is 
justified, it attests to the inherent intellectual attractions of sociological-type 
explanations which venture beyond the narrow confines of economic-like 
logic while remaining on firm empirical ground. 
III. TARGETING AREAS THAT MERIT ATTENTION 
A. Pinpointing Missing Empirical Components 
The literature surveyed in the preceding section goes a considerable 
way toward providing a solid foundation for obtaining insight into Chinese 
international legal compliance and systematically exploring the subject.103  A 
substantial amount of information has been generated, predominantly 
qualitative in nature, but some of it in quantitative form.  A large number of 
case studies have been conducted over a long period of time and in different 
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circumstances.104  Most have been of the stand-alone variety, yet there have 
been notable exceptions to the rule.  Virtually every relevant sphere of 
China’s international activity has come under scrutiny. 
Scholarly examination has often been inspired by descriptive 
concerns, or a desire to merely establish whether compliance occurs.  
However, the focus has increasingly shifted toward scientific-style analytical 
probing.  Key terms have carefully been defined, conceptual relationships 
have been dissected, and the issue of empirical manifestation (i.e., 
indicators) has been at least tentatively considered.  The explanations offered 
have at times been expressed in a fashion suited for problem-centered policy 
discourse, rather than academic learning, but the theoretical dimension has 
become more salient. 
Nevertheless, there is room for broadening the scope of inquiry and 
placing it on a firmer analytical footing.  One aspect of the research process 
that leaves something to be desired is the rather inadequate methodological 
basis underpinning it.  As pointed out above, the question of concept-
indicator connection has not been completely overlooked.  Be that as it may, 
the issue has not been dealt with comprehensively and effectively.  As 
matters stand, it continues for the most part to be consigned to the 
investigative periphery and is touched upon in passing, without a genuine 
effort to construct empirical measures and apply them. 
One notable exception to the norm has been the attempt to gauge 
China’s exercise of global responsibility and adherence to international law 
by resorting to data-derived proxies, even if rather crude in nature. Indicators 
such as membership in international organizations, number of headquarters 
and secretariats of such entities in the country, and volume of treaties 
acceded to have been employed in order to determine the level of and 
changes in overall rule conformity.105  Such measures are very rough indeed 
(e.g., are all treaties equally important?), but in the absence of quantitative 
indicators or equivalent one, are entirely dependent on subjective judgment 
of those performing the assessment. 
This is a domain where scholarship focused on the Chinese situation 
has simply not kept pace with developments elsewhere.  Compliance with 
human rights obligations of States is a case on point.  This has been a 
primary area of concern with respect to China.  It is an analytically, as well 
as politically, challenging subject to come to grips with.  However, precisely 
for that reason, it is one where close attention has long been paid to the need 
for reliable empirical measures and where the efforts made on this front have 
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borne some fruit, although the process may have not yet reached a mature 
stage.106 
Some of the indicators in question focus on developmental progress 
rather than adherence to human rights requirements per se.  Such empirical 
measures generate useful information for policy and related purposes, but 
they do not hold entities whose behavior is monitored accountable to 
international legal standards (i.e., they merely “examine the state of the 
situation and not the right to that situation”).107  By the same token, they 
seldom succeed in taking “discrimination into account and provide only a 
partial picture of the human rights situation in a [S]tate.”108 
Nevertheless, development indicators are not irrelevant in this context.   
Importantly, such empirical measures may overlap with their human rights 
counterparts (e.g., funds devoted to protecting human rights).109  Moreover, 
it is possible to disaggregate development indicators to a point whereby they 
reflect differential access to resources by distinct groups or the treatment of 
specific segments of the population.  If performed in a satisfactory fashion, 
the exercise may yield information that pertains to social discrimination and 
may thus support evaluation of a human rights regime.110 
Development indicators are produced on a large scale by various arms 
of the Chinese government and other parties.  Empirical measures centering 
on human rights directly are more difficult to obtain, but are neither so 
scarce nor so complicated to generate independently that omitting them 
altogether may legitimately be considered as a practical necessity.  There are 
human rights indicators that emphasize State violations and those that gauge 
the extent to which rights-holders enjoy their rights; event-based indicators; 
measures derived from socio-economic data; indicators capturing household 
perceptions; measures reflecting expert judgments; civil and political rights 
indicators; measures of economic, social, and cultural rights; structural 
indicators; process measures; outcome indicators; and benchmarks.111   
Students of China’s compliance with international law have made very 
limited headway in confronting this facet of the research enterprise. 
Empirical measures, even when they do not involve elaborate 
quantitative manipulation, are not an integral part of the craft of legal 
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scholarship.  Case studies, a time-tested qualitative method, are normally 
preferred and can be said to have served the profession more than 
adequately.  However, unless employed carefully and in a structured 
manner, this technique may be characterized by a high degree of 
fuzziness.112  Unless applicable standards of scientific inquiry are observed, 
questions of reliability and validity may be raised, irrespective of how 
conscientious the endeavor and how meticulous the dissection of the 
material.113 
The problem must to be confronted in descriptive case studies, 
especially if they entail the construction of typologies, whether deductive or 
inductive,114 but it may prove particularly challenging in explanatory 
research.  In such work, where theories are either built or tested,115 the 
attribution of causality looms large in the undertaking and this may 
necessitate the imposition of more stringent criteria for demonstrating the 
robustness of findings.116  Conceptual linkages need to be delineated with a 
measure of precision and in methodologically appropriate terms (i.e., 
direction, linearity, polarity, strength, symmetry, temporality, and so 
forth).117  The connection between theoretical generalizations and supporting 
evidence should be made as tight as realistically possible.118 
These issues are easier to address if prospective design (whereby 
changes are tracked forward over time)119 is relied upon than when 
retrospective format (whereby data are collected after the fact)120 is resorted 
to, which is typically the pattern in legal studies, but they cannot be 
overlooked in any circumstances.  However demanding such requirements 
are, the difficulties they pose can be at least partly circumvented by 
following the steps involved in the process of analytic induction.121  Tools 
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such as pattern matching, developed specially to enhance the effectiveness 
of qualitative inquiry,122 and employed successfully by sinologists in the 
international relations field,123 may further bolster the conceptual potential of 
case studies.124 
B. Identifying Missing Explanatory Ingredients 
China’s compliance with international law is a subject of great 
academic and practical interest, which is attracting growing scholarly 
attention.  Theoretical sophistication is not lacking, but the methodological 
foundations cannot be portrayed as sturdy.  Retrospective case studies are 
conducted liberally with few, if any, of the relevant scientific standards 
adhered to.  Embracing the findings generated unambiguously may be a 
risky proposition as there is no sufficient transparency and there is a distinct 
possibility that the same material, if dissected by another researcher, might 
be subject to a completely different interpretation, which is scarcely a trivial 
matter. 
The problems to which this gives rise vary from one school of thought 
to another.  The realist and (neoclassical) utilitarian fields are so crowded 
that one could argue that the conclusions offered by such a large number of 
scholars have a degree of consensual validity.125  The same argument may be 
extended, albeit less emphatically, to the institutionalist camp.  For those 
who subscribe to transnational legal process theory, the challenge is more 
formidable because the size of the group is rather modest.  Here, the entire 
                                                                                                                                                              
cases that might disprove the proposition) and revise the proposition until you achieve a causal proposition 
that accounts for all cases. See NORMAN K. DENZIN, THE RESEARCH ACT: A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS 192 (Aldine Publishing 1970). 
122
 See DE VAUS, supra note 113, at 253-60. 
123
 See HE, supra note 75, at 161-64. 
124
 Literal and theoretical replication may serve a similar purpose.  It consists of two interrelated 
questions and corresponding steps: Does the full set of outcome characteristics occur if the causal factor is 
present?  If so we have confirmation of our theory . . . We would then find another case where the 
presumed causal factor is present and see whether the full set of outcomes is also present in that case.  If so 
we have a literal replication of the previous case and further confirmation of our theory . . . Do we get cases 
where the presumed causal factor is present but only some of the predicted outcome characteristics are 
present?  If we find such cases then we have failed to replicate the theory and we would either reject or 
modify the theory.  If we could find no cases where the cause was present and the full set of outcomes was 
not present then we have a theoretical replication . . . We would then seek to find a case in which the 
presumed causal factor is not present.  That is, we should not find cases where we have the effects without 
our presumed cause.  If we fail to find any such cases we have achieved further theoretical replication.  See 
DE VAUS, supra note 113, at 262-63. 
125
 An indicator, or observation, possesses consensual validity when numerous persons in different 
situations accept it as a good measure of a concept or description of the underlying phenomenon.  See 
KENNETH J. MEIER, JEFFREY L. BRUDNEY & JOHN BOHTE, APPLIED STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC AND 
NONPROFIT ADMINISTRATION 17 (Thomson Wadworth 7th ed. 2009). 
64 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 1 
analytical edifice rests on one comprehensive survey126 and a handful of 
narrower investigations.127 
The picture painted cannot be unequivocally read in the way 
suggested by the authors because of the looseness of the conceptual 
framework.  Is rule conformity indeed the product of international 
participation or socialization, or is it the result of some other variable?  If the 
latter is the case, what is regarded here as the driving force may in fact be 
the outcome of different influences.  Even if international participation or 
socialization is part of the causal chain, it may be merely one element and 
not necessarily the most crucial.  And, if several variables are at work, what 
is the structure of the complex model?128 
Nor should increasing theoretical sophistication be mistaken for 
comprehensiveness.  The most glaring gap is the virtual absence of the 
domestic scene from explorations of Chinese conformity to international 
rules.  The intricate home front is treated as a metaphorical black box.  The 
sole notable exception to the norm is the previously mentioned attempt to 
predict compliance with the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.  
While it suffered from other flaws,129 the authors nevertheless put forward a 
model firmly rooted in group theory and went to considerable analytical and 
empirical lengths in their effort to determine how various domestic interests 
might impinge on policies vis-à-vis Hong Kong.130 
This is a puzzling configuration as the unitary actor assumption, while 
conceptually convenient for explanatory purposes, is at variance with the 
substantial body of writings on decision making in China.  In the early days 
of communist rule, there may have been a tendency to highlight the cohesion 
of the ruling elite (e.g., Mao-in-command formulation), but this perspective 
quickly gave way to approaches emphasizing factional disputes, ideological 
strains, institutional fragmentation, intra-elite conflict, power struggles, and 
so forth.131 Rendering such forces theoretically subservient to more 
concentrated (as distinct from diffuse) influences (e.g., international 
participation or socialization), whether abroad or at home, simply flies in the 
face of widely available evidence on Chinese strategy making and 
implementation. 
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Interestingly, domestic interests feature prominently in a strand of the 
rationalist literature on compliance with international law (to which realism 
and utilitarianism belong) which dispenses with the unitary actor framework.   
It is known as institutional liberalism, or alternatively liberal 
institutionalism, and its proponents disaggregate the State and bring into 
focus internal political processes.  They contend that the home environment 
is “much more complex than realists and institutionalists acknowledge. 
States are not unitary, but rather are the sum of many different parts.  
Understanding those parts—the political institutions, interest groups, and 
[S]tate actors—is essential to fully understanding [S]tate action on the world 
stage.”132 
The domestic-international nexus has not been merely identified as 
worthy of attention but has been examined in an analytically rigorous 
fashion.133  Scholars in the field of international relations whose expertise 
lies in China’s external relations have not been oblivious to these 
developments.  Some have approached the subject broadly,134 but others 
have addressed specific hypotheses found in conceptually advanced writings 
on rule conformity in the global arena.135  However, thus far, theoreticians 
concerned with Chinese international legal compliance have not moved 
decisively to close the gap. 
Another persistent and problematic characteristic of their work has 
been the single-factor structure of the explanations provided.  Sometimes it 
is desirable to unambiguously lean in one direction or another and enhance 
clarity by constructing a model around its crucial attributes.  In certain 
circumstances, this may also constitute the most effective way of capturing 
the essence of real phenomena, however intricate.  Nevertheless, the narrow 
path continually trodden by international law researchers on that front again 
flies in the face of evidence suggesting that a broader, multi-pronged 
strategy may be called for. 
It is interesting to contrast this pattern with the diverse route followed 
by economists and political scientists in exploring closely related topics such 
as China’s internationalization and multilateral diplomacy.  In the case of the 
former process, multiple explanations have been offered stressing the role of 
factors such as the prevalence of regulatory controls and the impact of their 
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lowering in a setting with a favorable (in the sense of being conducive to 
integration) incentive structure, pressures emanating from comparative 
advantage, influence of international market forces on domestic interests, 
institutional rigidity (and flexibility), development-oriented East Asian 
bureaucratic mindset, corporatist form of social organization (predisposing 
policy makers toward pro-business initiatives), administrative 
decentralization (unleashing powerful forces at the local level), the 
irresistible pull of network capitalism (driven by overseas Chinese), foreign 
maneuvering, and benefits captured by functionaries (and agents in general) 
reacting to these developments or spearheading them.136 
Some of these accounts are not inconsistent with those furnished by 
legal scholars, particularly ones with realist, utilitarian, and institutionalist 
inclinations.  Moreover, they may be regarded as competing to a certain 
extent.  At the same time, where appropriate, complementarity is not 
overlooked and, the diversity notwithstanding, attempts are being made to 
combine the separate threads into a coherent whole.137  The quest for 
synthesis is not pursued merely at the conceptual level but also in the 
empirical domain.  The entire loosely-connected and intricate theoretical 
edifice has been tested and refined in a series of case studies.138 
The dynamics of multilateral diplomacy is perhaps even more 
illuminating in this context because the process involves specific 
discretionary decisions supposedly taken at the top level of the 
organizational pyramid following an elaborate process of strategic 
deliberation (in a manner similar to acts of conformity to international law), 
although it would be inappropriate to liken it to a sophisticated game of 
chess, given that the usual behavioral qualifications apply.  One might be 
tempted here to embrace one explanation or another (self-interest, 
cooperative spirit, altruism, culturally-induced sense of community, 
international socialization, and so forth), but this temptation has generally 
been resisted. 
It should be noted at the outset that the shift toward multilateralism 
constitutes a radical, albeit not abrupt, departure for a country that “has for a 
long time clung to bilateralism or unilateralism in its handling of regional 
disputes and managing its foreign relations.”139  However one accounts for 
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it, this strategic turnaround “is phenomenal enough to call attention to it.”140  
Importantly, the fundamental adjustment that has taken place 
“brings . . . China . . . much closer to the evolving Western mentality in the 
way of viewing world affairs, as, concurrently multilateralism rises as a 
principle in the guidance of governmental foreign-policy making in major 
advanced industrialized countries.”141 
It should also be observed that the Chinese variant of multilateralism 
is selective in nature.  The rhetoric (word) may be devoid of ambiguities, but 
the practice (deed) does not display a similar strength of commitment to the 
principle.  Rather, there are policy domains “in which China does not want 
to be bound by multilateral diplomacy, and where it likes to continue to 
employ a bilateralist and even a unilateralist approach.”142  By the same 
token, the strategy is as much driven by a desire to promote a multipolar 
world order (i.e., erode American hegemonic dominance) as by a normative 
preference for interdependence in the positive sense of the term.143 
As to the underlying motives, there is a bias in favor of realist, 
utilitarian, and institutionalist explanations.  Multilateralism is supposed to 
be conducive to economic development, it provides a convenient antidote to 
hegemonic power (i.e., it promotes multipolarism), it enhances the country’s 
image (reputation, an important consideration in rationalist writings), and it 
furnishes an effective platform for managing security issues, particularly on 
a regional basis.144  However, there is also recognition that a complex 
interplay between domestic and international forces is at work (as posited by 
liberal institutionalists)145 and that the strategy is not without normative 
underpinnings, whatever their origins.146 
Analytical diversity, coupled with structural integration, is a salient 
feature of the study of Chinese international relations in general rather than 
merely in a limited number of policy realms.  The views expounded do not 
always stretch across the whole conceptual range and cannot readily be 
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harmonized in all circumstances.  It is not altogether uncommon for 
researchers to adopt a well-defined perspective (such as the realist 
standpoint) and apply it consistently without deviating from the chosen 
path,147 although this practice is rapidly becoming a thing of the past.   
However, there is awareness of competing or complementary approaches, 
absolute claims are eschewed, theoretical propositions are placed in a broad 
context, and sooner or later someone performs a balancing act by 
systematically accommodating the divergent or convergent insights within 
an overarching framework. 
Such a framework typically encompasses, in an organized manner, a 
host of domestic and external factors that impinge on foreign policy 
outcomes.  Domestic-external linkages are also accorded ample attention.  
The individual components of the entire architecture are carefully 
assembled, evaluated, fine-tuned, and consolidated.148  The product is a more 
complex but less fractured mosaic than encountered in the international law 
literature and, in terms of its explanatory effectiveness and heuristic value, a 
credible model toward which scholars concerned with China’s rule 
conformity in the global arena should possibly aspire.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Chinese civilization has deep and rich historical roots, but it has 
evolved in a cyclical fashion and has experienced a high degree of 
turbulence.  The peaks of exuberance and valleys of despondency traversed 
have had several noteworthy characteristics, including an orientation toward 
the outside world that may be portrayed as outward- or inward-looking.  
Since the curtain has descended on the 1949-1978 revolutionary era, China 
has recognized the merits of interdependence and has practiced 
multilateralism, albeit in its own peculiar way, or not unreservedly. 
The shift toward greater openness has apparently been accompanied 
by an increasing willingness to play by international rules.  An erstwhile 
rogue State seems to have been transformed into a status-quo power without 
exhibiting pronounced revisionist tendencies.  Researchers in the field of 
international law have been exploring to what extent this metamorphosis has 
taken place, in what circumstances, and for what reasons.  They have made 
considerable progress in that respect, but the picture remains hazy.  This is 
partly due to the intellectual challenge that the subject poses and the 
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relatively modest resources channeled toward its examination.  The 
comparison with international relations is not flattering, yet it is not 
completely valid because this has been a less intensive effort undertaken by 
a smaller group of scholars operating independently. 
However, it is legitimate to argue that there is room, even in the face 
of significant constraints, to place the whole enterprise on a firmer 
conceptual footing.  Lingering empirical issues must be grappled with and 
the quest for explanations needs to be pursued more rigorously.  As matters 
stand, the methodological and theoretical foundations are not solid enough to 
support unambiguous generalizations.  This is an unfortunate configuration 
given the importance of the question motivating scholarly endeavor in the 
sphere delineated in the present paper.  It is not inappropriate to contend that 
Chinese international legal compliance should be monitored as precisely as 
possible and understood better than is currently the case. 
Methodological and theoretical stocktaking, such as undertaken here, 
is by definition a backward-looking exercise.  The existing literature is 
placed under the proverbial microscope, its limitations are brought into 
focus, and the merits of alternative, hopefully more fruitful, research 
strategies are highlighted.  The forward-looking part of the project 
necessitates moving beyond retrospective base-building and applying the 
proposed analytical tools across the entire space involving China’s encounter 
with international law and in specific areas.  That is a task not just for the 
author of this article but also other scholars engaged, individually or 
collectively, in dissecting Chinese international legal behavior. 
 
